ON THE ACRIMONIOUSNESS OF INTELLECTUAL DISPUTES

Randall Collins
We must never forget that genuine schools [of thought] are sociological realities. They have their structures -relations between leaders and followers -their flags, their battle cries, their moods, their all-too-human interests. Their antagonisms come within the general sociology of group antagonisms and of party warfare. Victory and conquest, defeat and loss of ground, are in themselves values for such schools and part of their very existence.
-Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis
Ideally, we would like peace, harmony, and agreement. Or if that is unrealistic, and too boring, we would like disputes to be carried out in a friendly manner.
Ideals aside, acrimony is ideal material for sociological comparison. Acrimoniousness of disputes, and the viciousness of conflict more generally, are just the sort of variations whose conditions become visible from sufficiently overarching sociological distance. One might question whether it is valid or desirable to pull out intellectuals for special consideration, as one trend of late-twentiethcentury thought has been to expose intellectuals, to bring their motives and practices down to the mundane level of the rest of the social world; but my intent here is to sketch the wavering etiquette of intellectual conflict. My justification is sim- ply that intellectuals are distinctive, not in every respect but certainly in the one under consideration: they have a different way of carrying out conflicts than do street gangs, ethnic movements, or states, and we need a distinctive theory to deal with that difference. To say so is certainly not motivated by a desire to idealize intellectuals; the determination that intellectual conflicts are distinctive has arisen from the research itself.
How the Intellectual World Works
Let me begin by summarizing briefly a sociological theory of intellectual life, based on a comparative study of philosophers throughout Western and Asian history. 1 Among the findings reached is that the number of notable positions or factions in a thriving field of intellectual activity -whether in ancient Greece or India, medieval Islam or modern America -is quite limited. Whenever there is creative activity, there are rivals; the so-called great thinkers appear, at minimum, in pairs of contemporaries, and more typically there are three or more recognizably differing positions -but rarely as many, it would appear, as six. This is so regular a state of affairs globally that I have generalized it as a "law of small numbers." When only one position dominates the intellectual world, it is a time not of creativity but of stagnation, the reign of an orthodoxy from the past that is no longer creative. We see the same pattern in terms of intellectual networks, the chains of eminent teachers and pupils that channel the development of schools of thought across generations. Few such chains can sustain themselves from one generation to the next; but when the number of positions rises, I have found that, historically, some of the positions are squeezed out. They become superfluous, distractions in an attention space that can only accommodate a small number of positions at one time; thus they fail to recruit disciples in the following generation, and the lineage dies out. The limited field of attention is one source of intellectual acrimony.
The material bases of intellectual life, of course, affect the creation and dominance of ideas, but the evidence is that they do so only indirectly. The formulation of Marx and Engels, that class ideologies dominate according to who controls the means of intellectual production, has been widely adopted; thus it is common to speak of ideas reflecting bourgeois interests, for example, or reflect- The intellectual world is, sociologically, an attention space, a locus of intellectual action. This is to put the point generically; everything that we call a field, a discipline, a specialty, is its own attention space. sus, and what social organization of their community has been involved in producing it.) But in philosophy, the social sciences, and humanities, the law of small
numbers continues to be important. The fact that we remain committed to some version of the quest for truth, even as it recedes into the future, gives a poignant quality to intellectual life. Neither intellectual contention, nor the ideal of truth, is going to go away so long as intellectual creativity occurs; both are constitu- In the 1930s, the existentialist phenomenologists and the logical positivists were perfect foils, each exemplifying just the kind of philosophy that the other took to be most meaningless and most reprehensible as a mode of thinking or of living. To make a creative contribution -which is to say, to make a move that puts one at the center of developments and debates -one needs good network contacts early in one's career. This means not merely good contacts with those eminent in the action of the previous generation (although that is the typical pattern as well) but also contact with opponents, either directly or through short network chains; one needs a rapid and sophisticated sense of where arguments are opening up. Thus it is only superficially surprising that Carnap and Heidegger emerge from the same network of teachers -they share the neo-Kantian In the intellectual world, Robert Merton noted, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer -to which I would add: but not without struggle. Success in the intellectual world is not merely a matter of coming from the camp of the previously successful generation. The students of successful teachers do not necessarily inherit the same resources, go on to do important work, and receive the same honors for it, while their rivals start in obscurity and stay in obscurity.
Famous teachers have many pupils and hence much of the early struggle is among those who start with the same endowments. New intellectual positions must be forged against one another to make themselves distinctive, and these positions get attention to the extent that there are slots available in the atten- There can be career-niche rivals at various levels of the pyramid.
The life of each aspiring intellectual passes through a career turning point.
Many of us start with dreams of glory, emulating the intellectual heroes whose books we first read or whose ideas and personalities were held out to us as exemplars when we were young. Sooner or later, one settles into a particular level of the intellectual attention space: one progresses into the heart of the networks where the action has gone on in the generation of one's teachers and where the new lines of action are unfolding; or one finds oneself on the periphery, where
one can read and perhaps teach to others ideas that have already become central elsewhere. The individual must decide, whether consciously and explicitly or only by drift, and possibly through a considerable cloud of illusions, whether it is worth striving to contend for one of the limited number of highly visible positions. If this becomes implausible, another realistic choice, short of dropping out entirely, is to become a follower of the occupant of one of the prominent positions. There is the opportunity to become a specialist, applying some prominent theory to a subject matter honed narrowly enough that one achieves at least some aspect of uniqueness. Or one can become a commentator, an expositor; instead of striving to rival Foucault, one becomes a Foucault scholar. Often one can find considerable eminence as a commentator, especially if one is a pioneer in importing ideas from a foreign country or from one discipline into another.
Intellectual acrimony is most likely in that period when one's young career is just becoming a middle-aged career, and one has not yet quite realized that one is being squeezed by the limited attention space. This is the time for the sharpest attacks on those who are currently eminent, and on the gullibility of their followers -attacks conducted in the most objective terms: it is truth that suffers from the incoherence of my opponents, and only incidentally myself as possessor of a superior path to truth. But taking a sociological view, the attacker should not be convicted of insincerity. To be a serious participant in the intellectual world is to be committed to making a contribution to true knowledge, and the more committed one is, the more difficult it is to distinguish between the merit of the ideas one believes in and the recognition that one believes is owed to oneself. As a rule of thumb, the degree of disappointed ambition determines the level of acrimony. Those who have aimed the highest, and who hold to that aim the longest, are the most acrimonious in attacking their successful rivals. Those who hold out the longest in the face of the lack of recognition, keeping faith with their own idea of themselves, are those who are most likely to be negative about the successful. We all know the carper, the type of intellectual who disagrees with everyone, who never has anything good to say about anyone's newly published work. Most likely the carper is someone who once had a promising start, the object of much praise during youth, but who never could make it even at the top of some specialty and hangs doggedly on the periphery of the intellectual world.
The hypothesis could be tested by biographical comparisons, although we rarely undertake biographies of the unsuccessful.
Acrimony of a different sort happens when the young intellectual first begins to publish the work that is to give him or her an independent reputation.
Here we find the acrimony of the young against the older generation, the attack on one's teachers. This break occurs most sharply in those thinkers who have come from a lineage of distinguished teachers, for the danger of being unoriginal is greatest when one is under the spell of an impressive teacher. To continue someone else's ideas is to have no chance of independent recognition. Breaks with one's teachers are structurally most necessary at the higher levels of the intellectual world. This is not simply a psychological process, a universal Oedipal pattern of killing the father. The process varies, most notably with the degree of career ambition; and ambition is in turn structurally given, at the moments when the field is shifting and an array of new positions are opening up and superseding the old structure of rivalries. There is little Oedipal rebellion at the periphery of the field, little explicit and vehement breaking with obscure teachers; it is the important teachers who have the greatest magnetism, the greatest centrality in the attention space, and thus it is their pupils who have the most to gain in breaking away, and who must carry out the greatest transfer of emotional energy from their teachers to themselves. It is a typical pattern, in intellectual networks, for the major figures of each new generation to be pupils of the major figures of the previous generation, but what such pupils get from their teachers cannot be simply their ideas. What pupils learn that enables their own future eminence is the stance of being at the center of intellectual action; they appropriate and carry on the emotional energy, the ambitiousness, of their teachers.
Once the break is successfully made, later in a career, the polemic subsides. One thinks, for instance, of Engels as an elder statesman, recounting the history of Idealism and generously giving credit to the Idealists for opening a pathway to his and Marx's success. And many pupils of important teachers do not break away at all; there is no Oedipal break for those who recognize early that their own career pathway is to be followers, appliers of big ideas to particular specialties, or to be commentators on and propagators of the message of the schools in which they were trained.
In some curious cases, there is no need for a break, because the teacher dies and the pupil can step into the curatorial role of propagating and developing the great thinker's ideas as if they were his or her own. In the 1930s, the young soci- A final subtype of career rivalry is accompanied by a much more limited
form of acrimony, the priority dispute. These disputes over who should get credit for having first discovered and published an idea have been widely studied. Priority disputes can occur only in those fields in which there is a great deal of consensus on the criteria for a significant contribution, fields in which reputationsrather than having to wait for later generations to sort out whose ideas are worth remembering -are quickly established. Priority disputes are thus found in the natural sciences and in mathematics, at least since the time of the "scientific revolution." These are fields that I would characterize as "rapid-discovery science": their networks quickly settle the issue of the last round of controversy and get on to building the next round of discoveries upon it. Priority disputes do not much occur in philosophy, the humanities, and social sciences. Such disputes are a very focused and specific form of acrimony, corresponding to the highly focused and specialized organization of some fields of intellectual work; where the fields are not so minutely focused, acrimony must be more generalized. We all have our bêtes noires, the writers whom we cannot stand, from whom we have nothing to learn: these are on the whole persons occupying the same niche in attention space, at the level of our own specialty, perhaps using a different terminology, a somewhat different mix of arguments and evidence, but aiming at a topic so close that their success diminishes our own. There is an indirect use of priority accu- From the insider's viewpoint, the outsider misses just those questions that are significant, the lines of opposition that are of concern to those active inside the local attention space; outsiders are not focused on the same puzzles, and thus their work appears at best uninteresting or out of focus. This lack of fit is often seen as a lack of scholarly skill on the part of the outsiders, a failure to have undergone the appropriate apprenticeship, to "get their hands dirty" in the archives, at the lab bench, or in fieldwork. There actually are such failures, and plenty of blunders in amateur efforts. But insiders are generally ill-positioned to distinguish such failures from work in their field that is of interest in a frame of analysis developed in another field. To name an example near to my own heart, work in the sociology of philosophy is not the same as work done in the substantive controversies of philosophy or in the historiography of philosophy.
Reviewers drawn from the native population -the philosophers and historians of philosophy -naturally enough tend to overplay the privileged status of their own viewpoint. But indeed, there is no single vantage point; we each have our own dignity to uphold.
More generally, what sociologists or economists or anthropologists see as fruitful material in historiography, or in the practices of scientists or lawyers, may
2. Another source of hostile reviews, especially of books, is reviewers who are too close, i.e., rivals over the same niche in attention space. Between one kind of danger and not be perceptible at all to those inside, and may be regarded as a hostile intrusion, an unwarranted reduction of their own ontological context to an alien one. The late-twentieth-century movement of literary theory and its cognates, imported into the humanities from an amalgam of semiotics, phenomenological philosophy, and the social sciences, was experienced as an invasion by prior inhabitants of terrain that they took to be defined as the study of substantively The extent to which intruders try to be respectful of the fields they are intruding upon, or alternatively the extent to which they arrive as arrogant imperialists, depends upon the relative success of these intellectual movements on their home grounds and upon the pecking order of disciplines. Consider some current examples. The enthusiasm for well-funded developments in genetics and biology has spilled over into a cross-disciplinary movement of evolutionary biologists. Its strongest effects have been in psychology departments, where traditional versions of psychological research have been displaced or made precarious; evolutionary biology has intruded as well upon the topics of the social sciences (crime, gender roles, intelligence testing) in ways that have brought considerable hostility. In another part of the theater, economics has been riding high since the last decades of the twentieth century, both from the expansion of job opportunities for its graduates, as compared to those in other social science fields, and from the wave of political popularity of free-market economics. The success of economics as a field has added impetus to a movement of "rational choice"
or "public choice" theories, applying neoclassical economics to standing topics in political science and elsewhere. Strands of conflict are often tangled; the atmosphere is worsened when political differences are perceived to overlay these border-crossing disputes. But one thing at a time (for now, we must defer consideration of the political dimension).
We cannot decide the substantive merits of the positions of intruders and the defenders of borders before the event. By their fruits ye shall know them, and it is future practitioners and historians of our fields who alone will be in a position to observe how these movements have played themselves out. The past shows that new developments, especially in the academic world since the research university was established around 1800, have often come from border crossings.
This phenomenon is especially apparent in the natural sciences, where movements of physicists brought about biochemistry, and where the combinations of laboratory techniques from different disciplines have repeatedly given rise to new substantive areas. Elsewhere, cross-border colonization has brought developments such as an experimental psychology separate from philosophy departments, and both the logicist and phenomenological movements in the early twentieth century, as physicists and mathematicians overflowed into philosophy.
More abstractly, we can agree that one way in which intellectuals can find new materials to work upon and new things to say -and thus to make new careers with new centers of attention-is to recombine various strands of ideas and techniques from previous lineages of the intellectual world; and if these provoke new lines of conflict, so much the better for the excitement of intellectual action.
But to make this claim is not to take the position that the border-crossers 
Intellectual Fortresses
Another important form of intellectual hostility is based not on new movements and intrusions, but upon long-standing, institutionalized rivalries. For several A similar dynamic operated in the period of medieval India when the Hindu schools were institutionalized in the "six darshanas" (orthodox philosophies or viewpoints); these then kept up a stable set of alliances and splits among themselves. As long as the material bases were strong, intellectual criticisms by rivals led to responses that radicalized their differences, rather than to acceptance of the validity of what the opponent was urging. A conceptual scheme, as W. V.
Quine observed, has many points at which it can be adjusted without giving up its overall framework. Hence the collapse of a position comes, not from institutionalized lines of rivalry, but from a transformation of the entire attention space, in which entire sets of oppositions are squeezed out.
In late medieval Christendom, after many creative developments, scholastic philosophy became divided among Thomists, Scotists, and nominalists; each came to control its own universities as strongholds, where the opposing positions were excluded from the curriculum and the professorial chairs. Acute lines of mutual criticism were not taken to heart and did not disturb the balance of power.
These lines shifted only with the rumbling upheaval in the material bases for intellectual life. Positions outside the universities for thinkers drawing upon court patronage, and the new networks for circulating intellectual news, provided the home grounds, first for the humanists and then for the movement that eventually became known as the scientific revolution -these displaced the older scholastic rivalries and gave them, individually and en masse, the reputation of being archaic. It was then that the name of Duns Scotus, the "subtle doctor"
(whose merits were to be rediscovered centuries later by Heidegger), was transformed into a term of denigration: dunce.
Such periods of institutionalized rivalry occupy a medium level on the scale of acrimony; their mutual abuse is conventional rather than heated, unlike relations among new and old movements at times when an entire material base is displaced. Observing the confrontation of intellectual fortresses is analytically useful, because it sets up a contrast with situations in which intellectual acrimony is notably low: that is to say, periods when there is plenty of intellectual action and therefore disagreement, but name-calling and nastiness are relatively absent.
Across the history of philosophy, the periods of greatest innovation have been times when several rival intellectual networks have intersected at one or a few great centers of discussion. A classic example for the West is Athens at the time of Socrates. In the generations just previous, the philosophical networks were dispersed around various parts of Ionia and the Greek colonies of Italy (Magna Graecia), but in this period they came together (driven to a considerable extent by geopolitical developments) in one city. It was this confluence of networks that made it possible for an individual to acquire the stance of sophisticated encounter with many different viewpoints, and to rise to a metalevel of abstraction about the nature of intellectual objects; in short, these were the structural conditions that made it possible for someone to become "Socrates."
The point I want to emphasize is that debate in the newly self-conscious intellectual community in Athens was carried out under emerging conceptions of politeness; this quality is the charm that many generations of readers have been struck by in the Platonic dialogues. The new politeness was not simply the Greek cultural ethos, even of that time, but a particular mode of social organization among intellectuals, for it contrasted strongly with the surrounding ethos of citystate politics, which was often quite vituperative as well as violent. 4 Even the sophists, teachers of rhetoric and the art of argumentation, were not mere polemicists. For all their flaunted disagreements, the sophists become increasingly conscious of rules and standards of debate, and indeed the propensity of the sophists to show that they could argue on either side of a question was part of an increasing sophistication and cosmopolitanism, invoking the implicit ideal that true intellectuals can rise above being tied to partisan stances.
The golden moments of other world traditions of philosophy have similar patterns. Ancient Chinese philosophy crystallized in the fourth century b.c.e., when several courts of warring states employed scholars as ministers and diplomats, and brought together teachers from many schools to debate, notably at Wei and at the famous Chi-hsia Academy at Ch'i. In these centers of shifting membership, major thinkers like Chuang Tzu (the first important proto-Taoist) and
Hui Shih (a pioneer of abstract conceptual logic of the "school of names") debated, and sharpened their positions upon each other, but also associated as friends. This gentility among the Chinese intellectual elite is not a cultural trait, in the sense of a constant quality at all historical periods; there is plenty of petty hostility and indeed violent contentiousness to be found among Chinese schools in other periods, especially during that between the third and tenth centuries c.e., when Taoists, Confucians, and Buddhists were organized into intellectual fortresses. When the structural pattern appears again -the intersection of rival
networks at a few metropoles of lively intellectual action -the civility reappears. Despite strong intellectual and political differences, Wang An-Shih and Su Shih were privately friends, who received each other in retirement to paint and write poetry together.
In sum, the gracious, polite ways of debating, those that separate personal relations from intellectual disagreements, have tended, historically, to arise in cosmopolitan centers, where alliances are fluid and connections multiple.
Entrenched loyalists, hurling traditional epithets against traditional enemies, originate in the self-enclosed networks of isolated citadels.
Material Base Shifts
The seismic shifts of intellectual life, when one material base is displaced by Similar generic denigration goes on when two different modes of intellectual production confront one another on roughly equal terms: in the period since
World War II, "continental" thought has appeared, from the viewpoint of anglophone analytic philosophers, to be mere literary flash. In fact, continental philosophy is grounded in a distinctive organization of intellectual action -the blending of the elites of publishing, theater, and the academic world, all centered on Paris, where reputations are made before a high-culture audience of aspirants in each of these contexts. 5 Moreover, the critical mass of intellectuals assembled from all these career paths is large enough to be a force capable on occasion of dramatic political action, and this fact of life adds an engagé tone of political resonance to French thought. Thus it is the envy of more institutionally isolated American academics but also the butt of accusations about the faddishness and dogmatism characteristic of social movements.
After one mode of production displaces another, all is not sweetness and light within the victorious camp; they have a full attention space to divide up.
The together in a grand synthesis, notably in the system of Plotinus. In Europe in the early seventeenth century, when the scholastics were being shown the door by Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, and the rest of the new thinkers, the last great creative upheaval: where intellectual bases were entwined with religious organization, and the struggle of churches was a part of violent campaigns that rearranged state power, the conditions were present both for massive intellectual realignments -a pattern of creativity already discussed -and for shifting intellectual/ religious entanglements that could get one burned at the stake.
The entanglement of intellectual life with religious politics appears to bring the acrimoniousness of disputes to a peak. Politics has force as its ultimate weapon, and its coalitions, however democratic, are formed to gain control of that means of organized compulsion, the state. The intellectual world operates on a different terrain, where an argument carried only by force is not considered an argument at all. In this light, it seems strange to cluster religion with politics, since religions have on their own no coercive means of generating the moral solidarity and symbolic commitment that they pursue. But religious organizations differ from intellectual communities in that the aim is not argument and ongoing formulation of new positions, but rather the preservation and propagation of doctrines and practices expressive of ultimate commitments. Intellectuals are intrinsically divided by their factions, whereas religions generally attempt and claim to express communal inclusiveness. Most importantly for our purposes, the symbolic and emotional techniques of religions can be intensely and Neo-Confucian scholars, and syncretist movements sometimes extolled the "unity of the three doctrines," the notion that the three were saying the same thing in different terms.
In We may reach the same conclusion from the other end of the comparison.
Relative harmony and tolerance among intellectuals across religious and other factions occur where no faction has a strong, autonomous material base; instead, they rely on the same base and thus are thrown together into a common community -political coercion is not a weapon in their arsenals. Islamic Spain presented a situation in which intellectual life was based upon a network of small courts, where both Muslim and Jewish scholars served as court officials (a particularly cosmopolitan group were the medical doctors: the profession of Maimonides and Averroës, among other leading thinkers). These small states were often at war, but the complexities of geopolitics made for frequent shifting of alliances, which indeed sometimes even cut across to the Christian kingdoms; scholars were sent as diplomats, and their careers typically shifted from one court to another. Thus, although the courts comprised the material base, they were the
opposite of factional fortresses, for it was the network of scholars as a whole, circulating among the various courts, that was the focus of the community. And over time, the sense of intellectual excitement must have been building up as new initiatives in theology, philosophy, and science were launched -in literature too, even across linguistic lines (these were the times when courtly love poetry passed over from Muslim poets to the troubadours). 8 The sense of intellectual action yielded a magnetism, and we can envision the members of this network, for some golden years at least, feeling that it was more their home than any particular religion or political party could be. Intellectuals were involved in politics, but in a practical way rather than with ideological fervor. Politics was not calling the shots.
A comparable situation existed in those periods in China when the religious camps were not rivals for political favor -the center of political action was else- 
